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A PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH THE OFFICE
OF UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
Peter C. Alexander*
In this Article, Professor Alexander reviews the creation and develop-
ment of the Office of U.S. Trustee, an agency within the executive
branch of the federal government, authorized to oversee the adminis-
tration of all bankruptcy estates. Alexander asserts that the agency
has expanded its scope beyond its original mission, becoming a huge
bureaucracy that is widely criticized. By contrast, Alexander also
discusses the Bankruptcy Administrator Program, a bankruptcy
oversight system that exists within the federal districts in Alabama
and North Carolina. He presents the positive and negative comments
about that program and concludes that it is a more efficient system
than the U.S. Trustee Program. Lastly, Alexander proposes his own
model for bankruptcy case oversight, one that combines private
trustees and a decentralized management structure, as a substitute
for either the U.S. Trustee Program or the Bankruptcy Administrator
Program.
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, as part of an extensive bankruptcy reform statute,
Congress passed the Bankruptcy, Judges, United States Trust-
ees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986 (the Act).1 The
Act implemented nationwide the United States Trustee Program
(the UST Program), which had existed until that time as an
experimental program in eighteen federal judicial districts.2 The
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Associate Profes-
sor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A., Southern Illinois University at Carbon-
dale (1979); J.D., Northeastern University School of Law (1983). I would like to thank
Professors Harry Flechtner and Gregory Travalio for their comments on drafts of this
Article and Ruth Colker, one of my colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh, for her
mentorship and advice during the Article's creation. I also thank my research assistant,
Michael S. Nelson, for his invaluable research, writing, interviewing, and editing
assistance.
1. See Pub. L. No. 99-554, §§ 111, 301-311, 100 Stat. 3088, 3090, 3118 (1986)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-586 (1994)).
2. The 18 pilot districts were the Central District of California, the Eastern
District of Virginia, the Southern District of New York, the Northern Districts of
Alabama, Illinois, and Texas, and the Districts of Colorado, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUtJCY $ 6.02, at
6-25 to 6-26 (15th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1995).
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Act authorized the Office of the United States Trustee (the UST)
to oversee the administration of all bankruptcy estates in all
federal courts except those in Alabama and North Carolina.3 The
UST exists within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and
exercises oversight authority, empowered to take "such actions
as [it] deems to be appropriate to prevent undue delay"4 in the
administration of a bankrupt estate.5
Since 1986, the UST has grown into a massive bureaucracy.6
The UST Program contains twenty-one regions,7 with a U.S.
Trustee leading each region.' In the past decade, the UST has
broadened its scope of authority to include issues such as
3. The Act excepted the six federal districts in Alabama and North Carolina from
the U.S. Trustee Program. 28 U.S.C. § 581. These districts comprise the Bankruptcy
Administrator Program (the BA Program). See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN.,
ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES FOR THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM 8 (1995) [hereinafter
NAPA REPORT]. Operating similarly to the UST Program, the BA provides independent
oversight of the bankruptcy system. See generally MANUAL FOR BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRA-
TORS: JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REGULATIONS AND DIRECTOR'S GUIDELINES FOR BANKRUPTCY
ADMINISTRATORS If-1 to 11-3 (1993) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REGULATIONS]. The
BA Program pre-existed the U.S. Trustee Program (the UST Program) and the BA
jurisdictions may delay entry into the UST Program until 2002. See 28 U.S.C. § 581.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(G).
5. The current Mission Statement of the Office of the United States Trustee (the
UST) states:
The United States Trustee Program acts in the public interest to promote the
efficiency and to protect and preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy system. It
works to secure the just, speedy and economical resolution of bankruptcy cases;
monitors the conduct of parties and takes action to ensure compliance with
applicable laws and procedures; identifies and investigates bankruptcy fraud and
abuse; and oversees administrative functions in bankruptcy cases.
NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
6. As of 1995, the UST encompassed 94 judicial districts, with offices in 48 states.
See id. at 1. A central office, known as the Executive Office for United States Trustees,
directs all of the activities. See id. at 11. The Executive Office consists of three
organizational units. The first, the Office of Administration, is responsible for budgeting,
personnel, procurement, facilities, automation, and management matters. The second,
the Office of Review and Oversight, is responsible for overseeing internal and external
program operations. This department audits various segments of the UST Program and
reviews outside audits and reports in an attempt to train trustees, to resolve problems
that may arise involving private trustees, and to evaluate the performances of regional
and field offices. The third divisional office, the Office of General Counsel, oversees the
UST's litigation activities and provides in-house counsel to the UST Program. See id.
at 11-12.
7. The regions vary greatly both in geographic and caseload size. See id. at 26 n.2.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 581 (providing that each U.S. Trustee serves a five-year term
at the pleasure of the Attorney General). Additionally, the regions are subdivided further
into field offices. Assistant U.S. Trustees head most of the 93 field offices. The 21
regional offices each employ a staff of about 100, while the typical field office has
approximately 10 employees. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-13.
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detecting criminal activity within the bankruptcy system,9 en-
suring debtor compliance with the Bankruptcy Code' ° and
Bankruptcy Rules," and managing private trustees. As the
UST's scope has increased, however, so has its bureaucratic red
tape. Nothing illustrates this expansion more than the many
inflexible Guidelines that require parties in a bankruptcy,
particularly debtors in Chapter 11 business reorganizations, to
undertake many time-consuming and expensive ministerial
tasks. 2
This Article explores the UST Program's bureaucratic expan-
sion, concluding that the program does not fulfill its congression-
al mandate adequately. Part I reviews the program's evolution
since its creation. This Part also presents and examines a
competing system, the Bankruptcy Administrator Program (the
BA Program), which currently oversees the bankruptcy system
within the Alabama and North Carolina federal districts. 3 Part
II reviews court challenges to the UST Program. Part III intro-
duces reform proposals for the UST Program and concludes that
the BA Program-although not the optimal system-is preferable
to the UST Program. Finally, in Part III, the Article proposes
as an alternative to both systems a hybrid trustee model, which
pairs case administrators similar to trustees in a Chapter 12
farm reorganizations with judicial officers who select, monitor,
and audit the case trustee.
9. See generally NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that the UST's mission
is to ensure the bankruptcy system's integrity). Title 18 of the United States Code
classifies a variety of acts as bankruptcy crimes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-157 (1994)
(naming as crimes the concealing of assets, making false oaths and claims, committing
bribery, embezzling against the estate, entering into fixed fee agreements with a party
in interest or with an attorney for a party in interest, knowingly disregarding bankrupt-
cy law or rules, committing bankruptcy fraud, and an officer acting adversely against
the debtor's estate). In addition, the UST must report such crimes to the U.S. Attorney.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a). Fulfilling this responsibility requires aggressive monitoring by
the UST. The UST's responsibilities include imposing higher standards of accountability
on private trustees, establishing a program to eradicate significant backlogs in Chapter
7 case administration, and developing management control systems to promote uniform
and professional standards for all personnel overseen by the UST. See NAPA REPORT,
supra note 3, at 28.
10. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
11. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001-9036.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 182-87, 202-04.
13. See supra note 3.
4 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:1
I. THE UST PROGRAM
A. Creation
Congress, as part of the historic 1978 bankruptcy amend-
ments,14 created a pilot project known as the U.S. Trustee
Program. 5 Prior to the program's creation, bankruptcy judges
performed many of the administrative tasks now performed by
U.S. Trustees. i" Judges, in fact, played two roles: supervising the
administration of bankrupt estates and resolving the substantive
questions raised in each bankruptcy case. 7 By creating a legion
of autonomous federal officers, Congress hoped that the UST
Program would remove the bankruptcy judge from the daily
administration of bankruptcy estates, thereby allowing the
bankruptcy judge to function as a neutral jurist. 8
The UST Program has engendered controversy. Some in the
bankruptcy field object that the program has become "unduly
burdensome."'19 One court has held that the UST acts as a
regulatory body and violates federal law by failing to comply
with various provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.2°
14. Congress signed the Bankruptcy Code into law in 1978, but it did not become
effective until October 1, 1979. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)).
15. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-586.
16. See DAVID L. BUCHBINDER, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY 105 (1990).
17. See id.
18. Congress took its first step toward reformulating the bankruptcy jurist's position
in 1974, when it changed the title from bankruptcy referee to bankruptcy judge. Cf id.;
see Janet A. Flaccus, Bankruptcy Trustees' Compensation: An Issue of Court Control, 9
BANKR. DEV. J. 39, 41 (1992) (explaining that the trustees are independent and
autonomous from the courts); Lloyd D. George, From Orphan to Maturity: The Develop-
ment of the Bankruptcy System During L. Ralph Mecham's Tenure as Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1491, 1492-94
(1995) (observing that the 1978 Act created bankruptcyjudges and expanded their power
beyond administrative tasks); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws
in the United States, 3 AM. BANKIR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995) (detailing the evolution of the
bankruptcy judge's role); see also In re Plaza de Diego Shopping Ctr., Inc., 911 F.2d 820,
827 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Judges, United
States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986 indicates that Congress
created the UST expressly for assuming the ministerial and administrative duties of
bankruptcy judges).
19. NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 32.
20. See In re Gold Standard Banking, Inc., 179 B.R. 98, 105-06 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1995) (holding that the UST's requirement that Chapter 11 debtors imprint their checks
with "Debtor in Possession" did not constitute binding law as it was not promulgated
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994)).
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A former U.S. Trustee has even alleged that the program was
created to curb judicial power.2 Some notable confrontations
between UST staff, courts, and bankruptcy counsel have result-
ed from differences of opinion as to the limitations on the UST's
authority.22
B. Funding
Congress intended the UST to be self-funded through payment
of filing fees.23 Financial support for the program, however,
comes from many different sources,24 including congressional
appropriation.25 Notwithstanding the various funding sources,
the UST's financial position has deteriorated in recent years.26
The program has been plagued by revenue shortfalls due largely
to a decrease in the number of bankruptcy filings, particularly
Chapter 11 reorganizations.27 As the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) Committee noted, "The program's
financial position ... has changed from a 'profit' of $19.7 million
in fiscal year 1993 to a projected 'loss' of about $9 million in
fiscal year 1996. ''28
21. See John Ketzenberger, Firstmark Bankruptcy Heats Up, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J.,
Dec. 12, 1988, at 20 (attributing to former U.S. Trustee Kevin McCarthy the belief that
the UST was "created in 1978 as a check on judicial power").
22. - Cf id.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 589(a) (1994) (creating a fund for the UST Program).
Some argue that resting the UST's funding on filing fees has placed bankruptcy
beyond the financial reach of those debtors who cannot afford the required fees. See
generally Karen Gross, In Forma Pauperis In Bankruptcy: Reflecting On and Beyond
United States v. Kras, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 57 (1994) (suggesting that the
requirement of a bankruptcy filing fee may remove bankruptcy from the financial reach
of certain segments of the population).
24. Other sources of funding for the UST Program include increased filing fees in
cases filed under Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13; quarterly fees paid by debtors in Chapter
11 reorganizations; filing fees paid in connection with motions to convert cases to
Chapter 11; and compensation earned by panel and standing trustees pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 330(d) (1992). See 28 U.S.C. § 589(b); see also NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at
20 (noting that the UST receives $30 of the $130 Chapter 7 filing fee, $30 of the $130
Chapter 13 filing fee, $400 of the $800 Chapter 11 filing fee, and $100 of the $200
Chapter 12 filing fee).
25. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
26. See id. at 30 (noting that revenue shortfalls have become an urgent concern).
27. See id.
28. Id.
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C. Duties
Because of the many different types of bankruptcies,29 the
UST's specific duties vary depending upon the Bankruptcy Code
chapter under which a person seeks relief. In Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 cases-the most common bankruptcy filings 3 -the
UST performs primarily an oversight function supervising the
officers (known as "panel trustees" in Chapter 7 cases and
"standing trustees" in Chapter 13 litigation) managing those
cases. 31 In Chapter 12 and 13 cases, the UST is also responsible
for monitoring debtors' reorganization plans.32 In Chapter 11
cases, the UST's role is substantially different because the
debtor, usually a "debtor in possession,"33 does not have a panel
or standing trustee monitoring its daily activities. Instead, the
debtor in possession is left to direct its own financial affairs, as
well as its compliance with the Bankruptcy Code and Rules;
34
the debtor in possession must report regularly to the UST.35 In
addition, in Chapter 11 cases the UST has the power to appoint
committees to assist the debtor's reorganization effort.36 The
29. There are five different types of bankruptcy filings: Chapter 7 (straight bank-
ruptcy or liquidation); Chapter 9 (debt reorganization for municipalities); Chapter 11
(reorganization for business debtors or individuals with large amounts of debt); Chapter
12 (reorganization for family farmers); and Chapter 13 (wage-earner reorganization
plan). See 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY §§ 1-3, 1-5 (1992); see also NAPA
REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (describing the organization of the Bankruptcy Code into
chapters).
30. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (noting that of the 845,257 bankruptcy
cases filed from July 1993 to June 1994 about 70% were filed under Chapter 7, fewer
than 30% under Chapter 13, and about 2% under Chapter 11).
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a) (1994); see also Dan J. Schulman, Issues in Litigation,
4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 319, 319-20 (1995) (noting that U.S. Trustees are responsible for
administrative matters including selecting panel trustees in Chapter 7 cases and
standing trustees in Chapter 13 cases). Nationwide, approximately two thousand private
panel trustees supervise bankruptcy filings. See United States Trustee Program in
Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 35 (1991) [hereinafter House Hearing]
(statement of John E. Logan, Director, Executive Office of the United States Trustee).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(C).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1994).
34. See id.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(D).
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994). Such committees must include, but are not
limited to, unsecured creditors' committees. The UST may appoint additional committees
of creditors or equity security holders' committees as deemed appropriate. See id.; see
also Ericka Palmer Rogers, United States Trustee System, NEV. LAW., Mar. 1994, at 16,
18 (discussing the appointment of committees by the UST).
FALL 1996] A Proposal to Abolish the Office of the US. Trustee 7
Code does not authorize the UST to involve itself in Chapter 9
bankruptcies37 which involve municipal reorganizations."
The UST and its trustees undertake many other duties.
Commentator David L. Buchbinder refers to the broad list of
trustee responsibilities as the four "ates:" investigate, liquidate,
litigate, and administrate. 9 "Investigate" involves determining
whether a bankruptcy estate has any assets from which the
creditors can expect payment.4 ° "Liquidate" refers to the process
of converting reachable assets into cash in those bankruptcies
where such activity is appropriate.4 "Litigate" obviously refers
to court proceedings.42 "Administrate" refers not only to the
general requirement to follow the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and Rules but also to the specific obligation to maintain
and to distribute the cash within the bankruptcy estate.43
The House Report accompanying the Act outlined broad
responsibilities for the UST. The office is to
monitor applications for compensation and reimbursement;
... monitor plans and disclosure statements in chapter 11
cases; ... monitor plans in chapter 13 cases; ... make sure
that all reports, schedules, and fees required to be filed by
debtors (including the new filing fees due each quarter in
chapter 11 cases) are in fact filed; ... monitor the function-
ing of creditors' committees; ... notify the U.S. Attorney of
possible crimes uncovered and cooperate with the U.S.
Attorney in subsequent prosecutions; ... monitor progress
of bankruptcies and keep cases moving; and,. monitor the
employment of professional persons in bankruptcy cases.44
37. Cases filed under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code are reserved for munici-
palities. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1994).
38. See id. § 926(a) (giving the bankruptcy court, not the UST, the power to appoint
a trustee upon the request of a creditor and in very limited circumstances).
39. BUCHBINDER, supra note 16, at 106.
40. Id. at 107.
41. Id.
42. Id. As an example, Buchbinder suggests that one form of litigation that could
arise in the course of a bankruptcy is collecting accounts receivable which third parties
owe the debtor. Id.
43. Id.
44. In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 294, 296 (3rd Cir. 1994), citing H.R. REP.
NO. 99-764, at 24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227, 5237.
Although the UST's duties appear well delineated, the role of the trustee in bankrupt-
cy is rather difficult to define neatly. Over the years, a trustee has been regarded as a
representative of both the creditors and the debtor. In his guide for trustees, Judge
Alexander Paskay discusses the role of the trustee as varied yet riddled with potential
conflicts of interest. See ALEXANDER L. PASKAY, HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES AND RECEIVERS
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Generally, the UST has served a monitoring function, oppos-
ing breaches of fiduciary duty and eliminating corruption in the
bankruptcy system. Some courts, however, have described the
mission of the UST as more expansive than just acting as a
monitor: the UST is the representative of the public interest,
ensuring that the letter and spirit of the law are followed in all
bankruptcy cases.4" Accordingly, the UST has intervened in
Chapter 11 reorganizations with appointed creditors' commit-
tees, even though the debtor, the creditors, and the equity
security holders had not objected to the proposed action.46
IN BANKRUPTCY § 7.001, at 222-23 (1978). Regarding the trustee's relationship to
creditors, Judge Paskay writes:
The trustee is the statutory representative of all the creditors, and he holds the
assets of the estate in trust for their benefit. He represents all creditors, not only
the majority, however great that may be. He must be an impartial administrator
whose duty is to administer the estate for the benefit of each and every one of the
creditors.
In administering the estate, he cannot yield his judgment to that of the majority
of the creditors merely because they are the majority, without breach of his trust.
Of course, it is entirely proper for a trustee to consult with creditors about
important matters and get the benefit of their knowledge and experience. He is
duty bound to work in harmony with the creditors and follow their reasonable
suggestions, but he is not subject to their dictation and should follow his own best
judgment.
The'trustee's office is one of personal confidence, and the duties imposed upon
him are his and his alone. He cannot delegate his duties to others, and ultimately
he is responsible for all actions taken during the administration of the estate which
affect the interest of creditors. Moreover, he is responsible for actions not taken
when they are called for.
Id. Regarding the trustee's relationship to debtors, he writes:
In addition to representing the unsecured creditors, the trustee also represents
the bankrupt, in certain respects. He succeeds to the interest of the bankrupt, and
he is vested with the right, title, and power of the bankrupt as of the date of
adjudication....
In a rare case where there is a surplus, that is, funds remaining after a full
satisfaction of all claims proven and allowed, he holds such surplus for the benefit
of the bankrupt.
Id. at 223.
45. See In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d at 296 (noting that Congress has
stated that U.S. Trustees are responsible for protecting the public interest); In re Clark,
927 F.2d 793, 795 (4th Cir. 1991) (labeling the U.S. Trustee a "watchdog" who must see
that the bankruptcy laws are enforced); In re Plaza de Diego Shopping Ctr., Inc., 911
F.2d 820, 824 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting the U.S. Trustee's statutory responsibility to
represent and to protect the public); In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir.
1990) (opining that the U.S. Trustees protect the public interest just as watchdogs guard
the interests of those for whom they watch).
46. See United States Trustee v. Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138, 140-42 (3rd Cir.
1994) (detailing the U.S. Trustee's successful objection to employment of creditor
accounting firm where debtor requested use of the firm); cf. NAPA REPORT, supra note
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D. Comparing the Bankruptcy Administrator Program
The UST does not oversee the bankruptcy system in the six
federal judicial districts within Alabama and North Carolina.47
Instead, those jurisdictions participate in the BA Program.48
Within the BA Program, a licensed attorney,49 the Bankruptcy
Administrator, serves as a non-judicial officer of the judiciary.
50
The Circuit Courts of Appeals, following public notice and
review by merit selection panels, appoint Administrators 51 to
serve terms of five years. 52 An Administrator may be reappoint-
ed for additional five-year terms 53 and may be removed only for
"incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or
mental disability. 54 Like a U.S. Trustee, a Bankruptcy Adminis-
trator is completely independent of the bankruptcy courts as
well as the district courts and the court clerks. 55 Administrators,
like Trustees, have been granted statutory standing to raise any
issue in any case or proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code.56
Both Administrators and Trustees provide oversight to the
3, at 62 (noting that some observers believe the UST should be involved only when there
is no active creditors' committee); infra note 238.
47. See Schulman, supra note 31, at 321; see also supra note 3. Congress originally
provided that the UST Program would not become effective in Alabama or North
Carolina until the earlier of the following: the election of the districts within those states
to participate in the program, or October 1, 1992. See Dan J. Schulman, The Constitu-
tion, Interest Groups, and the Requirements of Uniformity: The United States Trustee
and the Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 74 NEB. L. REV. 91, 93 n.8 (1995). The 1992
date subsequently was extended to October 1, 2002. See Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 317(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (1990).
48. See Schulman, supra note 31, at 321. Discussions with bankruptcy judges and
officials of the BA in Alabama and North Carolina reveal that the districts in those two
states preferred the BA because of "extreme dissatisfaction with the operation of the
UST pilot program in the Northern District of Alabama." See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-133, BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION: JUSTIFICATION LACKING FOR
CONTINUING Two PARALLEL PROGRAMS 14 (1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
49. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REGULATIONS, supra note 3, at 1-9.
50. See id. at 1-2.
51. See id. at 1-3.
52. See id. at 1-10 to 1-12.
53. See id. at 1-13 to 1-14.
54. Id. at 1-3.
55. See THE BANKRUprc'i ADMINISTRATOR PROGRAM: QUESTIONS? ANSWERS question 3
[hereinafter BA PAMPHLET].
56. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REGULATIONS, supra note 3, at I-1.
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fiduciaries who administer bankrupt estates; 7 and the primary
goal of both the Administrator and the Trustee is to make sure
that creditors receive fair treatment in bankruptcy while grant-
ing the debtor the opportunity to have a fresh start.58
The primary distinction between the BA and the UST Pro-
gram is that the former operates under the auspices of the
judicial rather than the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment.59 Because the BA Program is under the control of the
judicial branch, Bankruptcy Administrators are not restricted
by federal guidelines as are U.S. Trustees. The philosophy of
decentralized authority that pervades the judiciary allows the
Bankruptcy Administrator to consider the unique conditions that
exist in each BA district without worrying about predetermined
federal guidelines.60 Bankruptcy Administrators are also able to
maintain a more cooperative relationship with bankruptcy
judges within their district.61 Cooperation results in a more
efficient resolution of bankruptcy petitions in many cases with
both creditors and debtors emerging winners.62 This difference
57. A Bankruptcy Administrator's duties include:
supervising all bankruptcy trustees; supervising all chapter 11 debtors-in-posses-
sion; referring criminal investigations to the U.S. Attorney and the F.B.I.;
appearing in bankruptcy, district and circuit courts on issues in bankruptcy cases;
auditing all chapter 7 cases for closing; reviewing. . . all requests for professional
fees; reviewing, and moving to dismiss if necessary, all cases abusing the bankrupt-
cy system.
BA PAMPHLET, supra note 55, at question 8. The duties ofa U.S. Trustee are similar. See
supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
58. See GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 2 (articulating the bankruptcy system's basic
objectives).
59. The Judicial Conference of the United States administers the BA. See BA
PAMPHLET, supra note 55, at question 4. The UST is an executive branch agency. See 28
U.S.C. § 581 (1994).
60. Telephone Interview with Marjorie K Lynch, Bankruptcy Administrator,
Eastern District of North Carolina (Nov. 20, 1995).
61. Cf JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REGULATIONS, supra note 3, at 1-2 (noting that bank-
ruptcy administrators must implement estate administration procedures consistentwith
the court's management of cases and proceedings). Judges may also hold positive feelings
about the BA because the Judicial Conference Regulations appear to be comprehensive,
obviating the need for judicial intervention in the BA's daily affairs. Compare In re
Butler Indus., Inc., 101 B.R. 194, 197 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 114 B.R. 695
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that when a panel trustee seeks to hire his own law
firm to perform UST tasks, he must "show 'cause'" to justify the trustee's own law firm
serving as counsel for the trustee), with JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REGULATIONS, supra note 13,
at II-I-11 (providing clear instructions for BA officers regarding applications for the
employment of professionals).
62. See Telephone Interview with Marjorie K Lynch, supra note 60.
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in administrative philosophy may account for the significant
differences in efficiency that exist between the two programs.63
An important distinction between the UST and the BA pro-
grams is the method of funding under which each operates. Both
systems collect fees from debtors. The BA Program deposits
those fees with the U.S. Treasury Department and then operates
with appropriated funds.64 By way of contrast, the UST deposits
its fees in an independent UST Program fund.65 Additionally,
while debtors in both UST and BA districts pay the same fees
when filing for bankruptcy, Chapter 11 debtors in BA districts
are not subject to the additional quarterly fees levied in UST
districts.6" The additional funding which the UST garners
through these quarterly fees allows the UST to operate as a
financially self-sufficient program67 while the BA districts fall
just short of self-sufficiency.6" A General Accounting Office
(GAO) report concluded, however, that if the quarterly fees for
Chapter 11 debtors were in effect in BA districts, the BA dis-
tricts would also be financially self-sufficient.69
In 1992, the GAO reviewed four BA and four UST districts
of similar size and concluded that the UST Program was
twenty-two percent more expensive to operate than the BA
Program.7° The gap in the efficiency of the two systems might
have been much greater had the GAO considered the addition-
al operational and support costs associated with the UST
Program as a result of direct personnel support from other
executive branch offices. 71 Relying on the GAO's conclusions,
advocates of the BA Program claim that a nationwide BA
63. Cf NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 33 ("Many observers have noted that a large
segment of the bankruptcy community-including judges, trustees, and practitioners-is
reluctant to accept intervention by the USTP [U.S. Trustee Program]."); Schulman, supra
note 47, at 125 ("The Administrative Office disagrees ... that the [UST] program should
survive. Rather, the Administrative Office... believes that the [BA] program is superior
and should supplant the [UST] program.").
64. See GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 11.
65. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 589(a) (1994) (establishing the U.S. Trustee fund).
66. See GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 11.
67. See id. at 12 (noting that the additional quarterly fees supplement income from
filing fees and interest on invested funds).
68. See id. at 11-12 (noting that, in 1990, BA Program costs exceeded collected fees
by about $290,000).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 6-7.
71. Cf id. at 7 (noting that the cost measurement did not include administrative
and legal support that the UST provided to district offices nor did it include support that
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts provided to BA districts).
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Program would cost eighteen to twenty-four million dollars less
per year to operate than a nationwide UST system.72
E. Evaluation of the UST Program's Performance
1. Evaluation Studies-When Congress established the
UST pilot, it called upon the Attorney General to evaluate the
pilot program. On January 3, 1984, the Attorney General
issued a "generally favorable report."7 3 The National Bankrupt-
cy Conference (the NBC) also reviewed the UST's operations
and ultimately recommended that Congress expand the pro-
gram nationwide.74 Congress had requested that the GAO
"compare relative efficiencies, costs, and results achieved in
comparable districts administered by U.S. Trustees and Bank-
ruptcy Administrators."75 The GAO report concluded that the
BA Program should be incorporated into the UST Program to
make "bankruptcy administration consistent across the
country,"76 but noted that "the U.S. Trustee programs were on
average 22 percent more expensive to operate than comparable
Bankruptcy Administrator programs."77 The GAO reasoned that
the BA should be incorporated into the UST rather than vice
versa because the legislative history clearly indicated that
Congress, in establishing the UST, intended to place the ad-
ministrative duties in bankruptcy matters within the executive
branch in order to separate completely the administrative and
judicial aspects of bankruptcy oversight.7 " The GAO report also
found that, despite differences in administrative costs, the two
72. See BA PAMPHLET, supra note 55, at question 9.
73. Schulman, supra note 31, at 320. The Report acknowledged that the Northern
District of Alabama-the only district in which both the UST and the BA systems had
been implemented-rejected the UST in favor of the BA. See id. at 321 & n.20.
74. See Bankruptcy Judgeship Authorization and A General Overview of the
Bankruptcy Code: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102nd Cong. 62 (1991) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]
(statement of Leonard Rosen, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Conference).
75. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 1. The request was made by Senator Sam
Nunn. See Schulman, supra note 31, at 321. The GAO selected the four BA districts
responsible for 80% of the bankruptcy filings and matched them with four UST
districts on the basis of "distribution of filings and qualitative factors, such as regional
economy, local demographics, and multiple offices." GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 5.
76. Schulman, supra note 31, at 322.
77. Id.
78. See GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 14.
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programs attained comparable results in that Chapter 7
creditors in the BA and UST districts surveyed obtained simi-
lar distributions of funds after the trustee liquidated the debt-
or's assets.7 9
More recently, the DOJ requested that the NAPA evaluate the
UST Program.8° The purpose of NAPA's investigation was to
"identify the Program's strengths and weaknesses in the context
of developing options for alternative structures and, if appropri-
ate, to recommend alternatives."81 NAPA's findings, issued in
May 1995, resulted from interviews and a review of pertinent
books, records, financial documents, and literature.
8 2
2. Findings:-a. Local Legal Culture-In his 1991 statement
before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Courts and Administrative Practice, Leonard Rosen, then chair
of the NBC, stated that variations in practice within each
bankruptcy court may contribute to the UST's ineffectiveness.83
His point may be well taken. Most federal district courts have
local rules, 4 and many jurisdictions have rules that apply only
to bankruptcy courts.85 Yet, rather than respond to local
79. See id. at 7. The GAO Report concluded that Chapter 7 creditors (priority,
secured, and unsecured) obtained similar distributions in BA and UST districts, but
unsecured creditors received 21% of the funds in UST districts and only 14% in BA
districts. UST districts were also able to process Chapter 7 cases slightly faster than
BA districts. No such conclusion could be reached regarding Chapter 11 cases. See id.
at 7-9.
80. See Marcia B. Pine & David R. Weinstein, The NAPA Report-The Push for
Privatization of the U.S. Trustee Program, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 1995, at 12.
81. Id. Pine and Weinstein suggest that the investigation was also a response to
congressional pressure to review governmental agencies to determine which offices could
be scaled back, eliminated, or privatized. See id.
82. See id. The study, however, was not exhaustive inasmuch as it did not address
the topic raised in this Article, namely whether to return UST-type oversight of the
bankruptcy system to the judiciary. The NAPA study instead focused on the Department
of Justice mandate to identify "alternative structures that would rely on greater
involvement of the private sector in USTP activities." See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3,
at 2.
83. See Senate Hearing, supra note 74, at 62 (statement of Leonard Rosen, Chair-
man, National Bankruptcy Conference) ("Many of the members participating in our
project believe that the U.S. Trustee system has been and is deficient, and that local
practice has seriously undermined the goal of a uniform administration of a uniform
bankruptcy law.").
84. For an illustration ofvariations in local rules see, LOCAL R. U.S. D. CT. (C.D. Ill.);
LOCAL R. U.S. D. CT. (S.D. Ind.); LOCAL R. U.S. D. CT. (E.D. Mich.); and LOCAL R. U.S. D.
CT. (E. & S.D.N.Y.).
85. See generally NoRmAN L. PERNIcK, BANKRuIrCY DEADLINE CHECKLIST 89 n.4 (1993)
(referring to the General Orders/Local Rules for the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts for the
District of Delaware).
In some jurisdictions, a court may prefer resolving bankruptcy disputes through court-
supervised negotiation rather than litigation. See, e.g., Lisa A. Lomax, Alternative
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practices and procedures, the UST thus far has preferred
uniform national guidelines to localized policies. 6 In some
instances, however, national procedures may not be the best
remedy. Indeed, the NAPA report suggests:
The USTs should-exercise limited discretion to vary national
requirements and to create regional policies when local
conditions demand it.... [The UST Program] should recog-
nize that the burdens imposed by policy initiatives are more
disruptive in some districts than in others, and should
permit flexibility in implementing national and regional
directives where appropriate. 7
In most jurisdictions, the bankruptcy bar is relatively small,
and judges and practitioners may have simplified local customs.
In the Central District of California, panel trustees have not had
to seek court approval to pay trustee expenses; instead they
have "freely deducted expenses from estates at their own
discretion, obtaining court approval only at the end of the
case.""8 The U.S. Trustee responsible for the Central District
noted the unique practice but stated that her office, in conjunc-
tion with the local bankruptcy court, was reviewing the practice
and should "shortly issue a directive substantially curtailing this
practice." 9 She reasons that establishing uniform "standards
and ensuring adherence requires infringing, to a degree, on local
practice."9 °
b. Effectiveness of the Office-In all of the studies concerning
the UST, great attention has been directed at the question of
Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: Rule 9019 and Bankruptcy Mediation Programs, 68
AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 70-71 (1994) (citing the recent establishment of court-annexed
mediation programs in the bankruptcy courts for the Southern District of California,
Middle District of Florida, Eastern District of Virginia, and the District of Oregon). In
other jurisdictions, the bankruptcy bar may be so small that many formal procedures
are dispensed with in favor of judicial efficiency.
For example, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Chief Judge Woodside prefers
having counsel meet in his chambers to resolve as many disputes as possible before
going into the courtroom to make the official record. This practice apparently has saved
many hours of trial. Telephone Interview with John Kelly, Law Clerk to Chief Judge
Robert J. Woodside (Oct. 10, 1996).
86. But see NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 35 (arguing that clear national policies
should be developed to ensure uniformity).
87. Id. at 35.
88. Marcy J.KI Tiffany, A Time of Change-A Two-Year Retrospective on the Office
of the United States Trustee, 21 CAL. BANKR. J. 13, 25 (1993).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 26.
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UST effectiveness. 91 The conclusions have varied. The GAO
Report 92 proclaimed that the UST and BA programs were
equally effective in obtaining distributions to creditors, with the
UST Program slightly more effective in obtaining dividends for
unsecured creditors and the BA Program slightly better for
secured creditors and priority creditors. 93 That same report also
concluded that the two systems processed cases with virtually
the same speed.94 The former chair of the NBC, however, has
suggested that the UST is not as effective as it should be. 95 The
chair of the ABA Business Bankruptcy Committee testified at
Senate hearings that much criticism of the UST results from
"poor judgment exercised by relatively junior persons [within the
UST Program] who lack experience in large reorganization[s]."98
By most accounts, the UST's charge, in its broadest sense, is
to uphold the integrity of the bankruptcy system.97 That should
involve, among other things, prosecuting bankruptcy fraud.98
The UST's vigilance in prosecution, however, appears subject to
question. In California's Central District for example, critics
have complained that too many people were permitted to file
bogus bankruptcy petitions. One newspaper reporter concluded
that those "who know the system concede that there are few
checks against cheating in consumer bankruptcy, even though
statements on bankruptcy filings are made under oath. It is like
the IRS trying to enforce honesty in the tax code with no threat
of an audit."99 A former FBI agent observed, "'The chances of
being caught for a bankruptcy crime are very slim."l°° Likewise,
91. See House Hearing, supra note 31 (conducting an oversight hearing on the U.S.
Trustee Program).
92. See supra text accompanying note 75.
93. See GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 7-9 & tbl.3.
94. See id. at 9.
95. See Senate Hearing, supra note 74, at 62 (statement of Leonard Rosen, Chair-
man, National Bankruptcy Conference) (commenting that the UST Program will not
succeed unless it is well financed and adequately staffed).
96. Id. at 107 (statement of Herbert P. Minkel, Jr., Chairman, Legislation Subcom-
mittee of the ABA Business Bankruptcy Committee). Minkel further commented: "No
one will be able to satisfy all of the members of the private bar concerning the operations
of the U.S. Trustee program. Any time discretion must be exercised by hundreds of
government officials concerning. . . sensitive issues [related to reorganization] ... there
will be some disaffected individuals." Id. at 108.
97. See supra notes 5, 44-45 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
99. Tom Furlong, Swamped by Debtors and Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at
Al.
100. Id. (quoting former FBI Agent William Atherton).
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in Seattle, "bankruptcy fraud was a crime that was not usually
prosecuted locally" until the U.S. Attorney assigned a special
prosecutor to that region to begin filing charges against suspect-
ed defrauders. 10 '
Concomitantly, many believe that the UST's bureaucratic
growth"2 has not improved significantly the bankruptcy system's
integrity.10 3 Consider a 1993 law journal article, authored by
then-U.S. Trustee Marcy Tiffany. °4 Reflecting on two years as
a U.S. Trustee, she noted one of the more stinging observations
made about the UST:
[The UST] Program, which was originally intended to be
regionally autonomous in much the way United States
Attorneys function, has become increasingly centralized
when it comes to policies and procedures. There has, [critics
of the UST] lament, been "an over-proliferation of proce-
dures, 'guidelines' and policy manuals, leaning toward the
bureaucratic style that Congress wished to avoid.""0 5
Other critics of the UST, and there are many, suggest that the
program was flawed at its inception because Congress "vastly
overstated the problems of the former system." 6 A 1992 Federal
Judicial Center survey of United States judges revealed that
sixteen percent of circuit judges and approximately fifty percent
of the bankruptcy judges favor eliminating the UST and return-
ing the agency to the judiciary.
0 7
Telling comments, however, came from L. Ralph Mecham,
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, in his response to a draft of the GAO report on the UST
and the BA programs. Mr. Mecham wrote, "The Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States has consistently opposed placement
101. Peter Lewis, Helmsley-Prosecution Team Member to Zero in on Bankruptcy
Fraud Here, SEATTLE TIMES, May 26, 1992, at B1.
102. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
103. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 60.
104. Tiffany, supra note 88.
105. Id. at 26. One example of the "overproliferation of procedures," according to
some is the UST's practice of reviewing all pleadings in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases.
See generally NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 32 (criticizing trustee oversight as "unduly
burdensome" and "overly bureaucratic"). Certain Chapter 7 panel trustees criticize the
procedure, arguing that because they are already charged with this function in Chapter
7 cases, for the UST to do the same thing is redundant. See id. at 62.
106. NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 33.
107. See id. at 33-34, 37 & n.7.
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of oversight of the administration of bankruptcy estates under
the Department of Justice. In fact, until 1986 the Department
of Justice itself also opposed placement of a permanent nation-
wide UST program in the Department."'08 Bankruptcy expert
Lawrence A. Beck proffered the following criticism in testimony
before the House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial
Law:,
Notwithstanding the valiant and praiseworthy efforts of the
first several United States Trustees in Chicago and New
York under the Pilot Program, the UST is not doing its job.
Although there are some bright spots, my opinion is that the
UST conceives its role to be protector of the lowly, underpaid
panel trustee. But, its role is to oversee and regulate the
panel trustee. And, panel trustees and their attorneys
eventually become some of the wealthiest members of the
bankruptcy bar.,"9
II. COURT CHALLENGES TO THE UST PROGRAM
In addition to several investigations conducted by the govern-
ment's legislative and executive branches, the courts have
reviewed the UST's activities. In a number of reported decisions,
parties (usually Chapter 11 debtors in possession) have chal-
lenged the UST's authority to impose guidelines on the debtor
or to involve itself in particular disputes within certain bank-
ruptcy cases. These challenges generally concern three broad
areas: (1) the UST's inflexible bureaucracy, (2) the UST's
efficiency, and (3) the UST's rule-making authority. Additionally,
in one recent case, St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc.,'" the
debtor raised a constitutional challenge to the collection of fees
to support the UST."'
108. Letter from L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, to Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting
Office 1 (July 15, 1992), reprinted in GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 39.
109. House Hearing, supra note 31, at 91 (statement of Lawrence A. Beck, Attorney).
110. 38 F.3d 1525 (9th Cir. 1994), modified, 46 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1995).
111. See id.
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A. Constitutional Challenge
In St. Angelo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
considered the constitutionality of requiring debtors in UST
jurisdictions to pay quarterly administrative fees.'12 Specifically,
Victoria Farms, Inc., filed a Chapter 11 reorganization and
sought to avoid paying the quarterly fee of more than $4000 to
the UST. Victoria argued that because the UST was not present
in every federal district (i.e., not in the federal courts in Ala-
bama or North Carolina), the bankruptcy oversight scheme was
not uniform.'13 Therefore, Victoria Farms argued, the UST with
its added requirement of quarterly fees violated the Uniformity
Clause. 1 4 In an interesting decision, the court accepted the
debtor's novel argument but rejected the debtor's conclusion. The
Ninth Circuit agreed that the existence of two parallel systems
did violate the Uniformity Clause." 5 Yet, the court did not hold
that uniformity could be established by relieving the debtor from
paying the UST fees, as Victoria Farms had requested."6
Rather, the court declared the BA Program invalid. 117 Relying
on Railway Labor Executives Association v. Gibbons,"8 the court
stated: "Congress may enact non-uniform laws to deal with
geographically isolated problems as long as the law operates
uniformly upon a given class of creditors and debtors."" 9 Ex-
plaining why the BA and the UST provisions do not operate
uniformly, the court stated:
It is clear that this is not a provision which has different
effects within North Carolina and Alabama due to differences
112. Chapter 11 debtors are required to pay quarterly fees (based on disbursements)
to support the UST Program. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) (1994). Originally, the fees were
to be collected until the debtor's plan of reorganization was confirmed; effective January
27, 1996, however, the fees are to be paid past the confirmation date until the case is
converted or dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a).
113. See St. Angelo, 38 F.3d at 1529.
114. See id. at 1533; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (providing, in relevant part,
that Congress has the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States").
115. See St. Angelo, 38 F.3d at 1531 (noting that the U.S. Trustee Program and its
supporting fee structure have not been implemented in Alabama and North Carolina).
116. See id. at 1532.
117. See id. at 1531-32.
118. 455 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (noting that enacting a law to govern a particular
region is acceptable provided that the law applies "uniformly to a defined class of
debtors").
119. St. Angelo, 38 F.3d at 1531.
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in the laws of these two states. North Carolina and Alabama
are the only states given the option to vote to adopt the U.S.
Trustee system before the end of the implementation period,
and these two states are the only ones that need not
implement the system until October 1, 2002. It is federal law,
rather than state law, that causes creditors and debtors to
be treated differently in North Carolina and Alabama.
In this case, however, Congress has provided no indication
that the exemption in question was intended to deal with a
problem specific to North Carolina and Alabama, nor can we
discern such a purpose in the structure of the statute [ex-
tending North Carolina's and Alabama's opt out period] or
the legislative history of the amendment. Indeed, because
creditors and debtors in states other than North Carolina
and Alabama are governed by a different, more costly system
for resolving bankruptcy disputes, it is clear that [the law]
... does not apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors.12 °
The Ninth Circuit opinion actually struck down the statutory
provisions that enabled the federal courts in Alabama and North
Carolina to opt out of the UST Program, even though such a
ruling has no binding effect in those federal districts.121
The practical effect of the Ninth Circuit's decision in St.
Angelo is that the UST and the BA Programs will continue to
operate until a similar challenge is mounted in the Fourth
Circuit (containing North Carolina) or the Eleventh Circuit
(containing Alabama). Such a challenge is unlikely since the
confrontation in St. Angelo was over the extra fees that debtors
in UST jurisdictions have to pay.1 2' No reasonable debtor in
North Carolina or Alabama will object to paying less money to
a Bankruptcy Administrator than the debtors in the other forty-
eight states pay to a U.S. Trustee.
120. Id. at 1531-32 (citation omitted).
121. See id. at 1533; see also Schulman, supra note 31, at 328-29 (questioning
whether the Ninth Circuit's action comports with the doctrine of judicial restraint and
suggesting that the St. Angelo ruling will give rise to litigation within the circuits that
do have the BA Program).
122. See St. Angelo, 38 F.3d at 1530-31.
20 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:1
The real question is why the St. Angelo court chose to involve
itself in the UST/BA controversy in the first place.123 Indeed, the
dissent remarks:
I do not deny that the issue might have merit for some
litigant in some court. Instead, I question the wisdom of a
Ninth Circuit panel deciding a constitutional issue which
has no effect on the review of the controversy before it, but
which will undoubtedly spawn litigation in the federal courts
for the districts [in North Carolina and Alabama], and which
may result in an intercircuit conflict between the Fourth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Such a decision is especially
unwise where the litigation and conflict engendered may go
unresolved for the eight years remaining under Section
3 17(a) until North Carolina and Alabama finally get United
States Trustees.
124
The answer to this question may lie with the majority concern
about the lack of legislative history explaining why Alabama
and North Carolina were permitted to opt out of the UST
Program and, further, about Congress' failure to acknowledge
the separate provisions for Alabama and North Carolina when
legislation was passed to expand the UST Program from its pilot
status to its present configuration.125 In fact, the St. Angelo court
correctly notes that the only official explanation for the parallel
systems appears as anecdotal evidence contained within the
GAO report, 26 which was produced after Congress extended the
deadline for Alabama and North Carolina to implement the UST
system. 1
27
123. Curiously, the St. Angelo court chose to consider the constitutional challenge
even though the debtor had not raised the issue in the lower courts. See id. at 1529
(noting that the issue was "purely a question of law" and within the court's discretion
to address). This decision was clearly incongruous with the Ninth Circuit's rule that the
court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See id. at 1535 (Poole,
J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Crane v. Arizona Republic, 972 F.2d 1511, 1520
(9th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33153 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 1996); Bolker v.
Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985)). Moreover, at least one commentator
has criticized this opinion as not comporting with traditional notions ofjudicial restraint.
See Schulman, supra note 31, at 329 (calling the decision "judicial activism, not judicial
restraint").
124. St. Angelo, 38 F.3d at 1535-36 (Poole, J., concurring and dissenting).
125. See id. at 1529.
126. See GAO REPORT, supra note 48.
127. See id. at 1529-30.
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The real reasons Alabama and North Carolina are not current-
ly participating in the UST Program may never be known.
Speculation runs from "'dissatisfaction with the operation of the
[USTI pilot program in the Northern District of Alabama""2 to
pure politics. In any event, the issue of whether the BA is
unconstitutional (or, perhaps, whether the UST is unconstitu-
tional) will most likely languish until a debtor in a BAjurisdic-
tion complains that it is paying too little to the bankruptcy
system-an unlikely complaint.
B. UST's Inflexible Bureaucracy
A criticism frequently levied against the UST is that itis an
inflexible bureaucracy, preferring form over substance.'29 The
NAPA report observed that the UST has become "overly bureau-
cratic and paperwork-intensive." 3 ' The NBC has recommended
that the duties and responsibilities of U.S. Trustees be further
defined and limited to matters of bankruptcy administration as
some U.S. Trustees "have overstepped their role in some cas-
es."131 One bankruptcy court, in criticizing the UST guidelines
regarding reorganization, opined that "[r]ather than assisting
debtors in reorganizing as Congress intended, unchecked United
States Trustee requirements could frustrate Congressional
intentions by torpedoing reorganization efforts with onerous pa-
perwork."
132
128. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 14 (quoting Harold A. Valentine, Associate
Director, Administration of Justice Issues); see also St. Angelo, 38 F.3d at 1530.
129. In certain instances, however, the UST's hard-line position is warranted. In In
re Interco Inc., 130 B.R. 301 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991), the UST objected to the request
of Chapter 11 debtors seeking a partial exemption from the requirements of § 345(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor to provide a bond or security for estate
funds not deposited or invested with an institution "insured or guaranteed by the United
States or by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States." 11 U.S.C.
§ 345(b) (1994). The UST objected that deposits of money placed with institutions not
insured or guaranteed as banks do not comply with § 345(b) and, thus, do not constitute
appropriate substitutes for a bond. See In re Interco Inc., 130 B.R. at 303. The UST
argued for literal compliance with the statute. The court noted that other courts had
interpreted § 345(b) as giving debtors some flexibility, but ultimately rejected the
debtors' request. See id. at 303.
130. NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 32.
131. NATIONAL BANKI. CONFERENCE'S CODE REvIEw PROJECT, NATIONAL BANKR. CONFER-
ENCE, REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: FINAL REPORT 240-42 (1994) [hereinafter NBC
FINAL REPORT].
132. In re Crosby, 93 B.R. 798, 805 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988).
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The UST is, at times, regarded as an interloper. In In re
Howard Insurance Agency, Inc. ,133 the UST objected to the final
account of a panel trustee, alleging that "it was unable to find
proper authorization for the [trustee's] disbursements and that
the case pleadings, being complicated and voluminous, did not
reveal orders of the Court authorizing said disbursements."34
In a terse opinion, the court stated: "Being unable to find the
orders authorizing the disbursements because of the pleadings
being voluminous is a poor, unacceptable reason for such an
allegation. It is not the duty of the [panel] Trustee to do the
work of the Office of the United States Trustee."135 The court
denied the UST's objection, chastising the UST for its obvious
"lack of communication and/or consideration" for the panel trust-
ee.136 Continuing its lambast, the court wrote:
The internal regulation or procedure of the United States
Trustee in preventing an individual access to the courts is
repugnant to this Court and violates the most fundamental
right of any individual to seek access to the Courts. In
addition, this procedure or regulation transcends and super-
sedes the statutory duties of a Trustee as set forth in Con-
gressional Acts and Bankruptcy Rules having the force and
effect of statutes. The Trustee is not an employee of the
United States Trustee's Office but is an officer of the court,
an independent entity with responsibilities to creditors and
equity security holders. 37
By way of comparison, the author could not locate a single case
wherein a judge or a debtor criticized the BA. In fact, the GAO
report comparing the two systems contains many positive
references to the BA.
138
133. 109 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989).
134. Id. at 446.
135. Id. at 447.
136. Id. at 446-47.
137. Id. at 446 (emphasis added). The court relented somewhat in a footnote,
acknowledging "the substantial workload of the Office of the United States Trustee" and
"their lack of ability to discharge their statutory duties." Id. at 447 n.1.
138. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 6-7 (reporting that the UST was
22% more expensive to operate than the BA); id. at 11 (reporting that debtors in BA
districts are not subject to the quarterly fees that debtors in UST districts must pay);
Schulman, supra note 31, at 321 (noting that Alabama and North Carolina bankruptcy
judges opted for the BA as an alternative to the UST pilot program in northern Alabama
with which they were dissatisfied).
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C. UST Efficiency
Some criticize the UST not for its inflexibility; rather they
argue that it wastefully expends energy in the pursuit of an
illusory principle or ideal. 139 Despite having offices in almost
every federal judicial district, staffed with personnel available
to oversee all consumer and business bankruptcies filed therein,
the UST has been criticized for its failure to distribute its
workload efficiently and to monitor the bankruptcy process
appropriately.14 In fact, the NAPA report found that the "distri-
bution of caseload by staff position varies significantly among
UST [field] offices."1
In re Revco D.S., Inc.'42 illustrates the inefficient use of UST
resources. In this case, the court entered an administrative
order, detailing the procedures to be followed for the allowance
and payment of interim fees and expenses. The order required
all applicants seeking fees to comply with the Memorandum
Regarding Allowance of Compensation for the Bankruptcy Courts
of the Northern District of Ohio.'43 Several professionals com-
plied with the court's directive, including the law firm of Baker
& Hostetler (Baker). Baker submitted an application for interim
compensation that detailed more than 11,000 hours of services
rendered in the bankruptcy and included documentation of all
expenses over twenty-five dollars.'44 The UST objected to Baker's
application. 4 ' Baker moved for sanctions against the UST
pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011.146 The motion was dismissed
without prejudice and Baker refiled after the bankruptcy court
approved its fee petition.147 The UST moved to dismiss the
renewed motion for sanctions.'48 The bankruptcy court held that
the UST, as a represented party, could be sanctioned under Rule
139. Cf NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 35.
140. See id. at 30-31.
141. Id. at 30 (footnote omitted). The NAPA report notes that 13 UST offices oversee
25 or fewer Chapter 11 cases per staff position while 9 offices oversee 100 or more
Chapter 11 cases per position. See id. The Report goes on to state that the Chapter 7
workload is equally disparate. See id.
142. 126 B.R. 741 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).





148. See id. at 744.
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9011,149 but the court further held that, in deference to the
UST's workload and staffing situation, Rule 9011 sanctions were
not appropriate. 150 The court stated,
At the time of the hearing, the UST's office employed three
staff attorneys and three paralegals. The three staff attor-
neys were responsible for reviewing the case load of the
Northern District of Ohio .... The responsibilities of the
UST staff attorneys include reviewing the pleadings in each
case sent to the UST's office; reviewing disclosure state-
ments and plans of reorganization and filing comments
thereon; reviewing monthly operating reports; generally
reviewing the administration of the cases; and reviewing fee
applications.' 5'
A more egregious situation existed in In re Nathurst,'52 where
a Chapter 7 debtor was awarded sanctions against a Chapter
7 trustee and the trustee's attorney for inappropriate actions on
the 'part of the panel trustee. 53 In Nathurst, the debtor was out
of state and requested that a scheduled examination (pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rule 2004)' 4 be postponed.'55 The record indi-
cates that although the examination was canceled, the trustee
filed a motion to have the debtor arrested and held based on his
failure to appear for examination.'56 The parties reached a
compromise by agreeing to reschedule the Rule 2004 exami-
nation prior to the court's ruling on the trustee's motion. The
trustee moved for apprehension of the debtor (for failing to
149. See id. at 747.
150. See id. at 749. The UST admitted that it had not reviewed the fee applications
in the case on a regular basis; the court found, however, that it was short-staffed,
overworked, and had done its best under the circumstances. See id.
151. Id. (citation omitted).
152. 176 B.R. 599 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
153. See id. at 601. The sanctions were imposed under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011, which
resembles FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
154. A "2004 examination" is a bankruptcy discovery device, akin to a deposition.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 permits the UST or a creditor to inquire into the debtor's
financial affairs beyond the questions asked at the first meeting of creditors under
section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code.
155. See In re Nathurst, 176 B.R. at 600. The Nathurst debtor had been interviewed
on a previous occasion for more than six hours. Id.
156. See id. The trustee's affidavit in support of her motion stated that the trustee
appeared for the (cancelled) 2004 hearing, notwithstanding the fact that the trustee was
clearly aware that the debtor was out of state and notwithstanding the fact that the
debtor's counsel requested a continuance. See id.
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appear at the examination), and the court allowed this motion. 157
Five days before the rescheduled Rule 2004 examination was to
take place, the trustee had the debtor placed in custody (out of
state) by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to the bankruptcy court's
order.158 Subsequently, the debtor moved to vacate the Order of
Apprehension; the request was granted. 5 9 The continued exami-
nation took place, and the debtor sought sanctions against the
trustee and trustee's attorney. 160 The court agreed and assessed
the trustee and her counsel a $5000 fine.'
6 '
From the reported facts, the UST does not appear to have
played any role in this trustee's activities, either supportive or
critical. Why the UST did not intervene in Nathurst is hard to
imagine."6 2 If someone within the UST had been reviewing the
pleadings in Nathurst, it seems that she might have informed
the trustee that a six-hour creditors' meeting, a Rule 2004
hearing, and a motion to arrest a debtor would not have been
necessary. Even if the procedures had been necessary, they
would have been causes for concern by the UST as the normal
Chapter 7 debtor inquiry consists of one creditors' meeting in
which the panel trustee asks four or five basic questions.' 3
Nathurst demonstrates that if the UST had executed its watch-
dog function efficiently not only the debtor but also the bank-
ruptcy system as a whole would have benefited.
In what may be the most disconcerting case, In re Sharon
Steel Corp.,164 the UST's intervention had questionable practical
implications. There, Sharon Steel, Sharon Specialty Steel, and
Monessen, Inc., the debtor, filed reorganizations. 65 The cases
were administered jointly and, shortly after the filing, the debtor
sought to employ Price Waterhouse as an accountant and
financial advisor for the debtor. 6 ' Price Waterhouse was owed
almost $876,000 for pre-petition services; yet, the bankruptcy
court--concerned with the practicalities of facilitating the
reorganization-authorized the employment nunc pro tunc to the
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 601.
160. See id. at 599.
161. See id. at 601.
162. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
163. See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (1994); see also BUCHBINDER, supra note 16, at 74-75.
164. 152 B.R. 447 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 154 B.R. 53 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd
sub non. United States Trustee v. Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994).
165. See id. at 448.
166. See id.
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filing date and continuing for one additional month.16 At the
continued hearing, only the UST filed an objection to Price
Waterhouse's employment, arguing that Price Waterhouse was
not disinterested. 6 ' In fact, the unsecured creditors committee
supported the retention of Price Waterhouse and "[bloth the
Committee and the secured lenders acknowledge[d] the difficulty
and the prohibitive cost of replacing Price Waterhouse.' 69 The
court overruled the UST objection. 7 °
In a thoughtful decision, the bankruptcy court acknowledged
that § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires an accounting
firm to be disinterested; the court stated, however, that it must
use "common sense when interpreting statutes.'' Judge Bentz
wrote:
The Debtor is a fully integrated steel company with
annual prepetition sales of $485,000,000. Price Waterhouse
has served as the Debtor's independent auditor since 1991.
In connection with their work prior to the bankruptcy filing,
Price Waterhouse became intimately familiar with the
Debtor's accounting systems, cost structure, inventories,
management information systems, and employee benefit
plans.... [The total] unsecured claims against this Debtor
will far exceed $100 million.
Price Waterhouse has stated by affidavit that it will not
participate as an unsecured creditor in the Debtor's Chapter
11 case nor will it vote its claim in connection with the
confirmation of any plan of reorganization.
While some courts do interpret § 327(a) literally, we believe
that a more practical view is required which considers the
167. See id.
168. See id. All professionals hired to provide services for a Chapter 11 debtor must
be disinterested. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1994) (requiring that a debtor in possession's
ability to choose professionals to assist the debtor be limited to disinterested entities
that do not hold or represent any interest adverse to the estate).
169. In re Sharon Steel Corp., 152 B.R. at 448.
170. See id. at 450.
171. Id. at 449 (quoting In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 114 B.R. 501,504 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1990)).
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economic realities of the case and the overriding purposes
of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. As the Supreme Court
stated in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, "[tihe fundamental
purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going
into liquidation, with the attendant loss ofjobs and possible
misuse of economic resources."
The Debtor has no cash to pay a retainer to a new firm
and it is unlikely that a new firm could be engaged without
a retainer given the serious possibility that this estate will
have no funds with which to pay administrative expenses.
Further, the Debtor is under tight time constraints to
complete its work and present it to the Court."'
The court's "practical view" apparently was lost on the UST,
which appealed the Bankruptcy Court's decision."7 3 The district
court affirmed the bankruptcy court; 174 but the Court of Appeals
reversed," 5 employing a strict constructionist reading of § 327(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code.
76
The subsequent procedural posture of the In re Sharon Steel
Corp. case begs an obvious question: What was gained by the
UST's action? One may conclude that the successor accounting
firm actually cost the bankruptcy estate more money because
of its obvious unfamiliarity with the corporations and the joint
reorganization.
The bankruptcy judge, the debtor, and the interested creditors
in Sharon Steel Corp. seemingly had a better understanding of
the realities of reorganization practice than the UST. Replacing
an accounting firm in a complicated Chapter 11 filing is costly,
and the debtor in possession did not have much money. Like-
wise, replacing an accounting firm takes time, which the debtor,
like all reorganizing debtors, lacked as well. Without a doubt,
the UST ultimately was vindicated by the Third Circuit, but the
172. Id. at 448-50 (citation omitted).
173. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 154 B.R. 53 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).
174. See id. at 56.
175. See United States Trustee v. Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994).
176. In reversing the district court, the court of appeals stated, "As the Supreme
Court and our court have repeated many times in recent years, when statutory language
is clear and unambiguous it ordinarily must be followed. Here, the relevant statutory
provisions are clear and unambiguous." Id. at 141 (citations omitted).
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UST's action did little to "protect and preserve the integrity of
the bankruptcy system."17 7 The UST's objection, particularly in
the absence of other opposition, required the expenditure of pre-
cious time and money, which stands in stark contrast to its
obligation to promote a "just, speedy and economical resolu-
tion. 178
D. The UST's Rule-Making Authority
By far, the greatest number of reported judicial decisions
concern the UST's ability to promulgate and to enforce ad-
ministrative rules in Chapter 11 reorganizations. The UST
provides these rules, known as Operating Guidelines and
Reporting Requirements for Debtors in Possession and Trustees
(Guidelines), to panel or standing trustees and to Chapter 11
debtors in possession 179 at the start of a case.' The Guidelines
provide a list of specific requirements imposed on all trustees
and debtors in possession and their counsel."'8 The requirements
range from simple (providing a list of the twenty largest unse-
cured creditors,8 2 suggesting a meeting with a UST representa-
tive prior to the first meeting of creditors, 8 3 and providing copies
of the debtor's most recently audited and unaudited financial
reports 8 4) to complex (providing complicated monthly operating
reports in a specified form'85 and writing a "Business Planning
Statement" containing a narrative of how the debtor's financial
affairs deteriorated and of the debtor's expectations of the
future'86 ) to burdensome (closing all banking accounts and
opening new ones with "debtor in possession" imprinted on all
177. See Mission Statement of the Office of the UST, reprinted in NAPA REPORT,
supra note 3, at 5.
178. See id.
179. In Chapter 11 cases where no trustee has been appointed, the debtor in
possession remains in control of the estate and is given most of the rights, powers, and
duties of a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1994).
180. See In re Crosby, 93 B.R. 798, 807-22 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988) for an example
of the UST's Operating Guidelines and Reporting Requirements for Debtors in Posses-
sion and Trustees (Guidelines).
181. See id.
182. See id. at 807.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 809.
185. See id. at 808.
186. See id. at 810.
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checks187). Moreover, these Guidelines do not differentiate
between large corporate reorganizations and small mom and pop
reorganizations. 8
Predictably, debtors in possession and other interested parties
have challenged the UST's authority to involve itself in some
aspects of bankruptcy administration." 9 In some cases, courts
have sided with the debtors, thus limiting UST authority. 190
The UST maintains that the Guidelines are mandatory and
that deviations therefrom are acceptable only when the UST
gives advance approval upon written application.'91 The courts,
however, do not necessarily share this view. 9 2 In In re Gold
Standard Banking, Inc. ,' for example, the court held that the
Bankruptcy Code provisions imposing reporting requirements
do not authorize specifically the Guideline requirement that all
debtor in possession checks bear the designation "Debtor In
Possession. ' 194 The court held additionally that, pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act,' 95 the UST had not issued the
check-modification requirement properly and that the require-
ment, therefore, did not bind the court. 196 The court opined that
as a result of the absence of either an express or implied
statutory duty ... on the Debtor to imprint its checks, or a
correlative enabling statute or rule, and in the absence of a
federal regulation authorizing the UST to so require, the
187. See id. at 808.
188. The Guidelines make no allowance for businesses with smaller workforces, fewer
resources, and less sophistication. For example, the Guidelines require complicated
financial documents to be filed with the UST regularly and in a particular format. See
id. at 807-22 (appending the Guidelines in effect in Georgia). Yet, small businesses often
lack in-house accountants and computer programs to present the financial statements
in a format acceptable to the UST, thereby requiring the businesses to incur the costs
of new software, new personnel training, or outside assistance. See Leif M. Clark,
Chapter 11-Does One Size Fit All?, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167, 176-77 (1996)
(citing a proposal to reduce the financial costs and wasted time of small debtors by
streamlining small business reorganizations).
189. See, e.g., infra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.
190. See generally In re Crosby, 93 B.R. at 802 (providing a particularly stinging
rebuke of the UST's position regarding its Guidelines).
191. See id. at 807.
192. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 106 B.R. 623, 624 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (denying the
UST's request to require debtor in possession to imprint checks with "Debtor In
Possession," and holding that the UST Guidelines did not carry the force or effect of law
and were therefore not legally binding upon the debtor).
193. 179 B.R. 98 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
194. See id. at 102.
195. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
196. In re Gold Standard Banking, 179 B.R. at 105-06.
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Court concludes that the requirement ... lacks the binding
effect of law to be enforceable.197
Another example of a UST and debtor in possession dispute
appears in In re Crosby.98 In this case, the UST moved to
convert a Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 liquidation because the
debtor did not comply with the UST's requirements. 99 Specifical-
ly, the UST alleged that the debtor, the owner of a mom and pop
retail pharmacy, failed to maintain bank accounts, failed to
provide proof of insurance, failed to file an inventory with the
UST, failed to file a real estate questionnaire or a "Business
Planning Statement," and had not filed monthly operating
reports until the morning of the hearing on the motion to
convert.200
The court acknowledged that the failure to file monthly
reports until the morning of the hearing constituted grounds for
dismissal, but declined to dismiss the case so early in the
reorganization on that ground alone. 21' The court then looked
at the reasonableness of the UST requirements and stated that
they were burdensome and unnecessary in the case of this small
operation.20 2 Continuing, the court held that the requirements
have not obtained the blessing of this or any other court as
mandatory, court ordered or approved requirements. While
they may be extremely useful to the United States Trustee,
the Debtor, and creditors in the case, and while debtors may
voluntarily comply with them, the determination of whether
a failure to comply carries with it any penalty is a matter
solely for judicial determination.2 3
197. Id. The debtor argued that the UST's requirement lacked statutory authority
under 11 U.S.C. § 586(a) (1994) (governing U.S. Trustee duties). See In re Gold Standard
Banking, 179 B.R. at 101. The court was persuaded, in part, because no Department
of Justice regulations governed the operations of debtors in possession in Chapter 11
cases. See id. at 101-02 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 58.1-.5 (1994)). The court went on to
describe the more typical procedure followed by federal agencies seeking to bind the
public with regulations that have the force of law, stating that the agencies, "normally
must promulgate 'legislative rules' made in accordance with the notice and comment
procedures specified by Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 105
(footnote and citation omitted).
198. 93 B.R. 798 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988).
199. See id. at 800.
200. See id. at 805.
201. See id. at 805-06. The court did, however, order the debtor to fulfill that
obligation in a timely fashion. See id.
202. See id. at 804-05.
203. Id. at 802.
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The court refused to approve identical UST requirements in all
cases and likened such a carte blanche approval to an abdication
of judicial responsibility, especially in reorganization cases
involving small businesses. °4
In In re HSSI, Inc. ,2° the UST claimed that the Chapter 11
debtor underpaid its UST fees.20 ' The debtor disagreed, challeng-
ing the UST's definition of "disbursement," upon which trustee's
fees are calculated. 27 At the hearing, the UST argued that the
court "must defer to its [the UST's] interpretation of 'disburse-
ment' in 28 U.S.C. § 1930 because the UST is responsible for
administering the assessment of statutory fees under that
section."202 The court declined to adopt the UST's interpretation,
stating that it was not required to adopt the UST's definition of
a term simply because the agency is responsible for administer-
ing bankruptcy statutes and regulations. 20 9 The court ruled in
favor of the debtor, finding the UST's definition overly burden-
some to the debtor.210
In some instances, the UST's actions appear nothing more
than overzealous safeguarding of the bankruptcy system's
integrity. Other times, however, the UST's staff members appear
to have been so bound by either the Guidelines or by the precise
words of a Bankruptcy Code that they have forgotten that the
bankruptcy court is a court of equity21 1 often preferring flexibili-
ty and efficiency over formality.
The legal effect of the Guidelines notwithstanding, courts
occasionally do rely on a failure to comply with the Guidelines
as a basis on which to dismiss or to convert a particular case.212
Reliance on the Guidelines in this fashion, however, is the
subject of some confusion. Sometimes the relationship between
204. See id. at 805.
205. 176 B.R. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 193 B.R. 851 (N.D.
Ill. 1996).
206. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) (1994).
207. See In re HSSI, 176 B.R. at 810.
208. Id. at 813.
209. See id. (noting that several qualifications limit the deference a court must give
to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is responsible for administer-
ing).
210. See id. at 815. On appeal, after adopting a definition of"disbursement" different
from that of the Bankruptcy Court or the UST, the district court reversed on separate
grounds. See In re HSSI, Inc., 193 B.R. 851 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
211. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493, 1498 (1995) (noting that
bankruptcy courts have the power to issue equitable decrees); Langenkamp v. Culp, 498
U.S. 42, 44 (1990) (referring to the bankruptcy court's "equitable power").
212. See, e.g., In re McClure, 69 B.R. 282, 290 (granting motion for dismissal); In re
Copy Crafters Quickprint, Inc., 92 B.R. 973, 986 (granting motion to convert).
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the failure to adhere to the Guidelines and the court action is
clear; occasionally, one is left to speculate as to the true reason.
For example, in In re Wilkins Investment Group, Inc.,213 the
bankruptcy judge dismissed a Chapter 11 reorganization where
the debtor failed to file monthly operating reports, even though
the applicable Code section did not specifically mention the
failure to file operating reports as cause for dismissal.214 In In
re Roma Group, Inc.,215 the Southern District of New York held
that the debtor in possession's failure to file monthly operating
statements as the local rules and the Guidelines required
"undermines the Chapter 11 process and constitutes cause for
dismissal or conversion of Chapter 11 proceedings."2"6 But upon
a close reading of Roma Group, Inc., the promulgation of a local
rule concerning monthly operating statements-actually not the
Guidelines-appears to have given rise to the threat of conver-
sion or dismissal.217
The foregoing cases suggest that, on occasion, the Guidelines
themselves will suffice as a basis for sanctioning a debtor. At
other times, however, courts seem to give local rules and stand-
ing orders bearing on the same or related issues greater weight.
As a result, the UST not only should have clearly defined
standards, but also should provide information to debtors and
213. 171 B.R. 194 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1994).
214. The relevant statute provides 10 facts that entitle a U.S. Trustee to convert or
dismiss a case for cause. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994). Section 1112(b) constitutes a
non-exclusive list, which stresses the particular importance of the monthly reports to
the creditors. See In re Wilkins Inv. Group, 171 B.R. at 196-97; see also In re Berryhill,
127 B.R. 427, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (dismissing case because debtors failed to
comply with court order requiring them to complete a reorganization plan, to file federal
tax returns, and to file monthly reports); In re McClure, 69 B.R. 282, 289 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1987) (dismissing case because debtor failed to cooperate with secured creditors,
to file a reorganization plan, and to file monthly statements); In re Modern Office
Supply, Inc., 28 B.R. 943, 945 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (converting case for failure to
provide financial data required by court order).
215. 165 B.R. 779 (S.D.N.Y 1994).
216. Id. at 780.
217. Likewise, in In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc., 65 B.R. 918 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y
1986), the court held that debtor's failure to comply with the Guidelines was sufficient
cause for the appointment of a trustee rather than conversion. See id. at 922. In addition
to failure to follow the Guidelines, however, several other factors supported the
appointment of a trustee--including failure to file schedules of assets and liabilities,
failure to obtain insurance, failure to pay rents as they became due, and failure to
propose a plan of reorganization. See id. at 921. Numerous conflicts of interest affected
the case, as the debtor, its lessor, and the mortgagee of the debtor's real estate were all
related entities. See id. at 920. The debtor also failed to make any "real progress" during
the five-month period between the filing and the petition giving rise to the instant
decision. See id. at 919.
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to other interested parties enabling them to understand which
Guidelines are mandatory and which are precatory.
III. THE UST's FUTURE
A. Reforming the UST: Proposals
In 1988, the NBC undertook a comprehensive review of the
Bankruptcy Code's first ten years of operation.218 The NBC's
Review Project issued a final report in 1994 recommending the
following improvements for the UST Program: (1) the Attorney
General should establish a national policy for the administration
of bankruptcy cases; (2) the UST's duties and responsibilities
should be further defined and limited to restrict its involvement
to matters of bankruptcy administration; (3) the UST should be
required to serve as case trustee in Chapter 7 cases in which a
private trustee willing to serve cannot be found; (4) the fees of
Chapter 7 trustees should be increased; and (5) section 327(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to permit a trustee
to act as his own attorney but not to hire the law firm for which
he works. 9
Most of NBC's recommended changes have received little
attention and have not been adopted.22 ° Even if adopted, it is
doubtful that the suggested changes would affect the UST's
operating costs. Arguably, the NBC's changes actually could
increase the overall cost of the UST because of the suggested
increase in fees for the private trustees.
Joseph Patchan, Director, Executive Office of the United
States Trustee, has also addressed the issue of UST reform. He
said that-as a result of the studies referenced in this arti-
cle 221-the UST would be "thinning out some of [its] audit
218. See NBC FINAL REPORT, supra note 131.
219. See id. at 239-48.
220. As of October 22, 1995, the Chapter 7 filing fee increased from $160 to $175.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) (1995). Congress also authorized the Judicial Conference to raise
funds through fees prescribed for notices of appearance, fees to be charged against
distribution in existing cases, and fees of the kind prescribed under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(b)
(1994). See generally A.B.A., THE BANKRuPTcY REFORM ACT OF 1994: WHAT You NEED TO
KNOW Now! 33-34 (1994).
221. See supra Part I.E.1.
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functions."222 He has reported that the UST "will be testing the
privatizing of some of [its] work"223 and stated that he will
recommend to the Bankruptcy Commission 224 and to Congress
that the UST regions be expanded to conform to the geographic-
al boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals, thereby
reducing the number of U.S. Trustees from twenty-one to
eleven.2 25
The Director's comments regarding the UST's privatization are
interesting in light of the fact that an express purpose of the
NAPA report was to study the feasibility of privatizing the
UST.226 The NAPA report rejects total privatization in favor of
either streamlining the organization and keeping it within the
DOJ or converting the program to a government corporation with
greater administrative flexibility and limited private contracts.227
Moreover, the study recommends privatizing a minimal number
of functions. 228 The NAPA reforms not only include partially
privatizing some administrative functions of the UST but also
address some substantive concerns. The NAPA report calls for
changes in the focus of the program, and the study recommends
that the UST "implement a number of streamlining measures
both to its organization and its operations, including eliminating
the regional layer [of administration] and consolidating field
222. Joseph Patchan, Director, Executive Office of the UST, Address at the Tri-State
Bankruptcy Symposium 6 (Nov. 10, 1995) (transcript on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Patchan Address].
223. Id.
224. Congress established the Bankruptcy Review Commission as part of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 601, 108 Stat. 4107, 4147 (1994)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)). The duties of the Bankruptcy Review
Commission are:
(1) to investigate and study issues and problems relating to title 11,
United States Code (commonly known as the "Bankruptcy Code");
(2) to evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements
with respect to such issues and problems;
(3) to prepare and submit to the Congress, the Chief Justice, and the
President a report [not later than 2 years after the date of its first
meeting]; and
(4) to solicit divergent views of all parties concerned with the operation
of the bankruptcy system.
Id. at 4147.
225. See Patchan Address, supra note 222, at 6.
226. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at ix.
227. See id. at 53.
228. See id. at 59-60 (suggesting the debt collection and financial monitoring
functions could be contracted out to private firms).
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offices. In addition, the panel believes some program functions
can be .. .reduced in scope."
229
B. Expanded Bankruptcy Administrator Program
Although the NAPA report did not undertake a comparison
of the UST and the BA programs, enough other information
exists to speculate on the success of an expanded BA Program.'
Notwithstanding that the St. Angelo court declared unconstitu-
tional the extension of time for the federal courts in Alabama
and North Carolina to join the UST system,2 31 one could argue
that the Ninth Circuit should have struck down the UST and
required that the BA be expanded nationwide. The BA Program
is more popular among its constituents than the UST Program
is among its constituents. 232 Moreover, the BA is arguably the
more cost-efficient program.233 St. Angelo held that the BA
Program was unconstitutional under the Uniformity Clause
because Congress created it without providing any indication
that the special treatment reserved for the federal districts in
Alabama and North Carolina was intended to deal with a prob-
lem specific to those two states.234 The court's analysis may have
stopped too soon. Creating a new system because of a belief that
the existing system is not effective, or at least is not as effective
as it could be, is certainly not inappropriate. That is exactly why
the BA Program was created. The legislative history of the act
creating the program indicates that the BA was established to
respond to the dissatisfaction of certain Alabama bankruptcy
229. Id. at 53.
230. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 4-16; Schulman, supra note 31, at
319-24.
231. See St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1525, 1532 (9th Cir. 1994),
modified, 46 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1995); see also supra notes 112-24 and accompanying
text.
232. Cf NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 35 (noting that a large segment of the
bankruptcy community is reluctant to accept intervention by the UST); Schulman, supra
note 31, at 321 n.20 (characterizing George S. Wright, Chief Bankruptcy Judge for the
Northern District of Alabama, as an ardent supporter of the BA).
233. See St. Angelo, 38 F.3d at 1531-32 (referring to the UST as a "more costly
system for resolving bankruptcy disputes"). The Administrative Office of U.S Courts
estimates that the BA is more efficient than the UST and would save $18 million to $22
million annually. See Schulman, supra note 31, at 323.
234. See St. Angelo, 38 F.3d at 1531-32.
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judges and others who had operated under the UST when it was
a pilot program within that state.235
The solution should not be to strike down the BA Program; it
works well and, by most accounts, remedies the problems of the
UST. Rather, the solution should be to strike down the
disfavored, more expensive system. The record laid out in this
Article clearly indicates that the BA is the better system2 36 and
that the UST Program should be eliminated.
The St. Angelo court erred in declaring the BA unconstitu-
tional; rather, it should have found the UST Program unconsti-
tutional.2 37 As an alternative, the court could have stayed a
decision regarding the constitutionality of either system until
Congress had a reasonable opportunity to decide which program
to require in all federal districts.
One explanation for the BA's superior efficiency is that it is
part of the government's judicial branch. Placing the agency
charged with overseeing the bankruptcy system within the
judiciary seems logical. From a practical perspective, doing so
would avoid the currently duplicative efforts of the UST Pro-
gram and the judiciary with regard to case management 238 as
235. See Schulman, supra note 31, at 321 & n.21.
236. Cf id. at 320 (commenting that the Attorney General's report concerning the
UST was only "generally favorable,"); Letter from L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Adminis-
trative Office of U.S. Courts, to Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General, U.S.
General Accounting Office (July 15, 1992), reprinted in GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at
40 (opining that the BA was superior to the UST Program and calling for the BA to be
expanded into UST districts).
237. The practical effect of the Ninth Circuit decision, however, is minimal as the
BA does not exist in any federal court within the Ninth Circuit.
238. The National Bankruptcy Conference recommends that either Title 11 or Title
28 of the U.S. Code be amended to limit the role of the UST, especially in those
instances where private trustees or creditors' committees exist. See NBC FINAL REPORT,
supra note 131, at 240-41.
The UST's involvement in matters other than bankruptcy administration cannot be
explained reasonably when creditors' committees and/or private trustees are present in
a case. One could argue that, even in the face of acquiescence by all of the other
interested parties, the UST has an independent duty to safeguard the bankruptcy
system. If, however, the parties (who are supervised by a judge) receive a pleading and
choose not to oppose the requested action, the system is not harmed. Rather, the system
works as it was designed to work: all parties involved in a dispute receive notice and
an opportunity to be heard regarding the subject matter. Those parties who rest on their
rights will likely have the matter in question resolved against them, but that does not
harm the bankruptcy system. Consequently, in these cases where the interests at stake
are adequately represented should be curtailed. Cf United States Trustee v. Price
Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1994) (where the UST was the only party
objecting to the alleged bias of the debtor's accountant, ultimately costing the estate
considerable time and money to replace said accountant).
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well as information gathering and storage.239 From a more
theoretical perspective, doing so would eliminate separation of
powers issues 2' ° and avoid conflicts of interest in cases where
the DOJ represents the United States as a creditor in bankrupt-
241cies.
The BA is not, however, without drawbacks. The Judicial
Conference Regulations give each Administrator the power to
hire as many secretarial, clerical, or other assistants as neces-
sary242-thereby creating the potential for an unwieldly bureau-
cracy similar to that currently encumbering the UST program.
Moreover, just like the UST Program, the BA Program requires
copies of nearly every pleading filed in every bankruptcy case,
including pleadings that are not always necessary for monitoring
the debtor's case and that are always available from the clerk
of the court.243 These two facts alone give reason to believe that
the BA's destiny is that of a lumbering bureaucracy.
239. Currently, debtors and other interested parties are required to provide not only
the Clerk of the Court with copies of pleadings (for the court and for the private
trustees) but also the UST because the UST maintains separate files and storage
facilities. Many of the documents currently provided to the UST could be eliminated if
the agency were part of the judicial branch. Similarly, incorporating the UST into the
judicial branch could eliminate the need for duplicative information storage systems,
thereby reducing the staff necessary to gather, docket, and store files, further reducing
the agency's operation costs. Additionally, the courts and the UST maintain duplicative
automations systems, which, if consolidated, could save approximately $1.4 million per
year. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 63. The NAPA noted that a poor working
relationship between the UST and the courts "affects data and information sharing,
generates duplicate analysis of trustee reports, and breeds distrust in a number of
districts". Id. at 34. Arguably, if both the UST and the courts existed within the judicial
branch, this relationship would improve.
240. See id. at 34; see, e.g., United States v. Wood, 161 B.R. 17, 20-21 (D.N.J. 1993)
(considering whether the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, which took away from the courts the power to appoint
trustees, also removed the power of the bankruptcy court to review the fees set by the
Attorney General for private trustees); cf In re Marriott, 156 B.R. 803, 805 (noting that
Congress vested the executive branch with authority to set trustees fees and "thereby
eliminated the judiciary's role in overseeing compensation for such trustees").
241. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 34. In its present form, the UST is an agency
within the Department ofJustice. See id. at 1. Consequently, the Department of Justice
(through the UST which is supposed to be a neutral party within bankruptcy) oversees
cases in which the United States is a creditor and represented by the U.S. Attorney's
Office (also within Department).
242. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REGULATIONS, supra note 3, at 1-14.
243. See id. at 11-1-2.
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C. Another Model: The Private Trustee
Notwithstanding the foregoing proposals for replacing the
UST, there is, perhaps, another model that could provide case
oversight of Chapter 11 bankruptcies without the current level
of bureaucracy.
Consider Chapter 12 farm reorganizations: here a private
trustee with limited authority is responsible for receiving and
disbursing the debtor's plan payments, but she does not assume
responsibility for operating the family farm.244 Because Chapter
12 is a hybrid of Chapters 11 and 13, the duties of the trustee
are unique: the trustee monitors the debtor's progress (as the
UST or BA would do in Chapter 11) and the trustee pays the
creditors pursuant to the debtor's plan (as a standing trustee
would in Chapter 13).245 There is every reason to believe that
such an officer could assist the court and uphold the integrity
of the bankruptcy system in a Chapter 11 reorganization.
These trustees would have no responsibility to manage the
debtor's affairs unless appointed by the court,246 but they would
be charged with reporting oversight. More accurately, each
trustee's function would be to maintain regularized communica-
tion with the debtor in possession and the creditors' committee(s)
to ensure compliance with filing deadlines and court orders, and
to work consistently toward a successful reorganization.
Specifically, the private trustee assigned to a reorganization
would conduct the first meeting of creditors pursuant to section
341 of the Bankruptcy Code (but not be required to pay the
debtor's creditors),247 meet regularly with the debtor in posses-
sion to chart the debtor's financial progress, and mediate
disputes between the debtor in possession and the creditors,
244. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 16, at 324; see also BRIAN A- BLUM, BANKRupTCY AND
DEBTOR/CREDITOR: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 153-54 (1993) (explaining that the trustee
is concerned with investigating the debtor's affairs and making recommendations on the
debtor's plan while the debtor continues farming operations under the trustee's super-
vision).
245. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 16, at 324.
246. The court would appoint a trustee pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. See 11
U.S.C. § 1104 (1994) (detailing the reasons for and process of appointing a trustee).
247. In cases filed under Chapters 7, 12, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, private
trustees currently conduct the section 341 meetings. The UST or the BA conducts them
in cases filed under Chapter 11. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-16.
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especially those serving on the unsecured creditors' committee.248
She would be responsible for making sure that all deadlines are
met and for bringing to the court's attention any irregularities
or impediments to confirming a plan that might exist. The
debtor, however, would still be responsible for operating its
business, complying with the requirements of the court and the
Bankruptcy Code, and carrying out the terms of its confirmed
plan of reorganization.
The infrastructure necessary to facilitate the use of private
trustees in Chapter 11 cases would be far less complicated than
that in either the UST or BA systems. Each judicial district
could appoint one court administrator, whose responsibilities
would include selecting all of the private and standing trustees,
supervising their conduct, auditing their books and records
periodically, appointing creditors' committees, and reporting to
the chief bankruptcy judge of each district.249 Each district
division would employ a reasonable number of staff persons to
assist the court administrator. Employing dozens of analysts
and assistants to review reams of paper from every Chapter 11
filed and to second-guess the actions of every debtor's counsel
would be unnecessary. The private trustee appointed to a
particular case would be responsible for day-to-day oversight,
248. The notion of a trustee being authorized to mediate a dispute may be novel;
however, one suspects that panel and standing trustees involve themselves, informally,
in disputes between debtors and creditors all of the time. Moreover, the Bankruptcy
Rules provide a mechanism for approving compromises and for employing at least one
form of alternative dispute resolution in a bankruptcy context:
(a) Compromise.
On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may
approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the
United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule
2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.
(b) Authority to Compromise or Settle Controversies within Classes.
After a hearing on such notice as the court may direct, the court may fix
a class or classes of controversies and authorize the trustee to compromise
or settle controversies within such class or classes without further hearing
or notice.
(c) Arbitration.
On stipulation of the parties to any controversy affecting the estate the
court may authorize the matter to be submitted to final and binding arbitra-
tion.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
249. To avoid the resurrection of charges of bankruptcy judges exercising too much
influence over the selection and supervision of trustees, courts of appeals could appoint
the court administrators to serve for a specified number of years.
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accommodating local practices, and tailoring the level of over-
sight to each division and to each case. Moreover, filing addi-
tional copies of pleadings with the court administrator would
be unnecessary because the private trustee would have copies
of all pleadings just as the private trustee does in cases filed
under Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 of the Code. Extra document
copies for the UST's analysis and/or auditors would no longer
be necessary.
This "decentralized oversight" model addresses the concerns
of those who criticize the UST for its lack of attention to varia-
tions in local practice, and might even reduce the total number
of copies of petitions, motions, objections, etc. that are filed for
the purpose of keeping the central office of the UST or the BA
informed.25 ° In addition, the introduction of private trustees
might be an asset to a reorganizing debtor, provided that the
court administrator seeks to employ trustees who have some
skill or expertise in the debtor's business area. For example, if
the debtor in possession is a retail outfit, a trustee could be
selected who has some experience with the operation of a retail
business. That way, the trustee has some insight as to the
debtor's operation and may be in a better position to anticipate
problems than if the trustee had no such expertise.
The concept of using a court administrator to oversee Chapter
11 activity has not been studied; consequently, no data detail
how expensive such a program would be to construct and
operate.25 1 Likewise, no studies have been conducted to estimate
how much it would cost to dismantle the UST and BA programs,
should a "court administrator" program be implemented. Such
research is clearly necessary before serious efforts are made to
institute a new program. Based on the studies conducted thus
far, however, it would appear that a decentralized system of
private trustees supervised by a court administrator in each
judicial district would maintain the integrity of the bankruptcy
system, improve efficiency of the administrative oversight in
Chapter 11 cases, and reduce the mounting filing fees that cur-
rently subsidize the UST. 2
250. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REGULATIONS, supra note 3, app. A at I; NAPA
REPORT, supra note 2, at 62.
251. Although exact funding sources would have to be ascertained, conceivably, the
private trustees and the court administrator positions could be funded from the UST's
portion of the Chapter 11 filing fee and some or all of the Chapter 11 quarterly fees that
debtors in possession currently pay.
252. Cf NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 53-59 (presenting an alternative structure
that includes reducing management, contracting out debt collection services, and
adjusting financial monitoring practices).
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CONCLUSION
Congress created the UST Program for a respectable purpose:
to rid the bankruptcy system of cronyism and "good ol' boy"
networking and self-dealing.253 With the UST Program, Congress
also hoped to remove from bankruptcy judges most of the
administrative details with which they were embroiled prior to
the UST's establishment. 254 The idea was laudable, but the
result has been to create a huge bureaucracy that is expensive
to operate and which may not be as effective as everyone had
hoped.255
Based, in part, on the experiences of those federal judicial
districts participating in the pilot UST Program, the district
courts in Alabama and North Carolina opted out of the UST
Program.256 Instead, these districts implemented a competing
program: the BA.257 The BA seems to work as effectively as the
UST Program, and accomplishes the same goals. The BA Pro-
gram, however, does so at lower cost.25 8 Yet, the BA Program is
not without its detractors. Most notably, the Ninth Circuit has
declared that the system is unconstitutional.2 9 Undaunted, the
BA Program continues to operate within Alabama and North
Carolina.
Perhaps it is time for Congress to take a closer look at the BA
Program. The Ninth Circuit was correct in determining that
having two competing agencies of bankruptcy oversight is
unconstitutional under the Uniformity Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 2 0 The court was incorrect, however, in declaring
that the BA Program should be eliminated. The BA enjoys
greater popularity among the judges, bankruptcy practitioners,
and creditors subject to its authority, and it is less costly to
operate. The BA, however, has the potential to become a mas-
sive bureaucracy like the UST.
As an alternative, expanding the use of private trustees in
Chapter 11 cases, so as to mimic the role of private trustees in
253. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at ix.
254. See id. at 1.
255. See id. at 29-35.
256. See id. at 1.
257. See GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 1.
258. See Schulman, supra note 47, at 124.
259. See St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1529, 1531-32 (9th Cir. 1994),
modified, 46 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1995); supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
260. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
42 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:1
Chapter 12 farm reorganizations, should be given serious
thought. The private trustee could assist the debtor in pos-
session in dealing with the court and creditors. The trustee, if
chosen properly, might even provide the debtor with some
substantive expertise to aid in the reorganization. Furthermore,
the private trustee could continue to serve a watchdog function,
requiring the debtor to adhere to all court deadlines and to abide
by the terms of the plan of reorganization.
A streamlined office led by a court administrator could super-
vise the Chapter 11 trustee, as well as other trustees. This
administrator would oversee assistants (who would be appointed
in each division of every district), while selecting and monitoring
the activities of all of the private trustees operating within the
bankruptcy system.
Regardless of which model is proposed for the future, it
appears that shifting emphasis away from the current UST
Program could reduce noticeably the bankruptcy system's
operating costs. This reduction in costs would yield a savings to
debtors who operate within the system. This savings, ideally,
would yield greater dividends to creditors.
